On this day 7th June
1842 – 52nd – Moved from St John to Frederickton, New Brunswick (Canada).
1876 – 52nd – The Depot Companies moved from Fort Wallington to Oxford to be incorporated with the 42nd Brigade Depot.
1916 - 1st Bn. (previously Provisional Bn.) Oxf & Bucks LI moved to Amara to refit.
1917 – 2nd Bn OXF & BUCKS LI – ROCLINCOURT.
82nd Reinforcement – 36 Rank and File joined.
Casualties – Wounded = 1
1917 – 1/1st Buckinghamshire Battalion – OUTPOST LINE.
Battn in the Line – Quiet Day. B Coy carried out an attack on enemy post situated K26a92 35. Zero 12mn. Attack carried out in accordance with 00 22 attached.
The attack started at 12.5 after a five minute barrage by 1 section of field guns according to programme. The enemy opened rifle fire before the assault took place but was silenced by Lewis Gun fire from trench in front of “CAGE”. This is confirmed by statement made by Unter Officer taken prisoner that the Machine Gun fire forced them behind the bank so that the next thing they knew was that the English were on top of them. There was concertina barbed wire in front of the canal but little difficulty was experienced in dragging it out of the way.
After the assaulting platoons got in there was a bombing fight for a few minutes, but the enemy soon gave in when our men went down the bank to them.
No attempt at a Counter Attack was made, but rifle grenades were fired from the opposite bank & from under the Canal bank further North at intervals for the rest of the night.
With the help of a RE Officer & 1 Platoon 5/R SUSSEX, the task of consolidation was quickly started & continued without interruption until 2.30am when it became very light. Besides the platoon of 5/R SUSSEX, 2 Platoons A Coy and the Support Platoon B Coy were sent up to help with the work.
A position was dug at K26a92 35 with a traversed trench about 30 yards long facing North and a Zig Zag trench 50 yards long under the canal bank facing East, the South end being connected up by a CT (Communication Trench) to the “CAGE” Trench.
The new post is garrisoned by 1 LG (Lewis Gun) Section & 1 Bombing Section & is sited on the wall & commands all ground up to the SLAG HEAP (K20 Central).
Prisoners Captured - 11 of the 41st IR
They state that the piquet has consisted of 2 groups of 1 NCO & 8 Men. 4 Were killed during our assault.
Our Casualties – 2 OR Killed 9 OR Wounded
Name of Officer I/C Attacking Force – 2LT E H FAWCITT
Ration Strength: 21 Officers 604 OR.
1944 - 2nd (Airborne) Bn, Oxf & Bucks LI -HEROUVILETTE
Engaged in capture of Herouvilette
0130 - Regiment passed Start Point 110739 moving forward to the Chateau in RANVILLE a temporary H.Q. was set up there.
The remainder of the Regiment moved into the area of the Chateau grounds and took up a position of all round defence.
Elements of the Bridge Assault Party joined us there including Capt B.C.E. Priday and the load from his glider, who having landed in the area of VARAVILLE Bridge, fought their way back to join the Regiment.
0230 - 13 Para Bn had been in contact with the enemy up to dark and reported that he was occupying HEROUVILLETTE.
On arrival at the Chateau it was arranged that the Regiment should take over the patrolling in front of 13 Para Bn and 'C' Coy was ordered to send out fighting patrols to discover whether the enemy were still in HEROUVILLETTE.
These patrols reported by 0430 hrs that there was no sign of the enemy in the village though they had not entered it.
'C' Coy was therefore ordered to move forward and seize the Western portion of HEROUVILLETTE and send patrols to discover whether the enemy were holding the Eastern portion.
'A' and 'B' Coys were then to move forward and seize the Eastern portion.
Meanwhile the remainder of the Regiment were to move forward to the area of the farm at 119728. This move was completed without opposition by 0830 hrs.
0830 - The Commanding Officer then decided to make a similar advance by bounds to seize and occupy ESCOVILLE the task allotted to the Regiment in the original plan before leaving ENGLAND.
'A' and 'B' Coys patrols moved forward to the village which they reported clear except for a few snipers.
1000 - At 1000 hrs 'A' and 'B' Coys were ordered to move up and occupy the positions already allotted to them and they were followed by 'D' Coy and Regimental H.Q.
'C' Coy was to remain at HEROUVILLETTE as a firm base until the remainder of the Regiment was established in ESCOVILLE.
At 1030 hrs the leading Coys reached ESCOVILLE and started to dig in.
1100 - Regimental H.Q. attempted to establish itself in CHATEAU 124714 as arranged but came under accurate fire from an enemy Self Propelled gun firing from a hull-down position about 250 yds South of the CHATEAU.
Attempts were made to dislodge this enemy gun with 6-pdr guns and PIAT parties but these proved unsuccessful. The Self Propelled gun appeared to be well protected by snipers. Meanwhile 'D' Coy moved round into its allotted position.
1200 - Coys were in position but experiencing difficulty owing to fire from armoured cars and other Self Propelled guns and snipers who appeared to be on a reverse slope position just South of the village and which were continually moving about.
We were visited about this time by the Brigade Commander.
Battalion HQ had still failed to get into the CHATEAU and HQ had been set up in a line of trees about 100 yds North of the CHATEAU itself. Shortly after this the enemy started accurate mortar fire in area of Regimental HQ and some casualties were suffered.
Owing to very accurate fire from enemy armoured vehicles 'A' and 'D' Coys had been unable to get well forward into good positions of observation and in particular the Anti/Tank guns were unable to get into their allotted positions or even into positions from which they could engaged the enemy Self Propelled guns.
1400 - Mortar fire and gun fire continued to be experienced by all Coys and an appreciable number of casualties were incurred. The enemy were very well concealed and although 3" Mortars were brought to bear on any Self Propelled guns that showed themselves fire was rather ineffective due to lack of observation.
1500 - The enemy began to become more bold and succeeded in shooting up the right forward Coy rather badly. At about this time fire from mortars and Self Propelled guns became intensified and enemy infantry began to infiltrate forward supported by tanks and one or two armoured cars. Owing to the fact that the Regt had never managed to get into an organised co-ordinated defensive position and there was considerable danger of becoming outflanked in a position not suitable for defence in view of the fact that ST. HONORINE had not been captured the Commanding Officerr asked for permission from Brigade to withdraw to a position on the highest ground in the village of HEROUVILLETTE. This permission was granted.
1600 - The Regiment withdrew to HEROUVILLETTE with 'C' Coy acting as rearguard protection. A portion of 'D' Coy the left forward Coy and 'A' Coy the right forward Coy who were heavily engaged at the time became cut off and had a spirited battle with enemy Armoured Fighting Vehicle's.
The Vickers Machine Gun's with 'A' Coy did some very good work before they withdrew.
'B' Coy reformed about 400 yds North of ESCOVILLE and were sent in as a counter attack to extricate the forward Coys. This was successfully accomplished with some casualties.
1700 - The Regiment took up a defensive position in the area of HEROUVILLETTE and commenced to dig in. Recce Patrols were sent forward to discover the enemy's further intentions. The remainder of the day and night was spent digging in. During the day the Regiment had suffered about 60 casualties. The Commanding Officer who had been injured on landing and was unable to get about on foot was evacuated by Medical Authority at about 2100 hrs and command of the Regiment was taken over by Major M. Darrell-Brown 2 i/comd.
1944-1st Buckinghamshire Battalion - NORMANDY
At his order group the the commanding officer stated that:
(a) Until the strong-point at Lion-sur-Mer could be captured the original plan was not practicable and the beach maintenance area could not be established.
(b) Development of the beaches, vehicle and transit areas would proceed as originally planned.
(c) Sector stores dumps established in rear of the beaches would be enlarged to hold all stores landed.
(d) Traffic circuits would be adjusted accordingly.
Work now started in earnest. Entrances and exits were completed, beach roadway put down, signs erected, and an ever-growing stream of men, stores and vehicles began to pour ashore. The beach was littered with debris of every description: wrecked landing craft, airborne bicycles, packs, explosives, waterproofing material, smashed tanks, and all the indescribable litter of war impeded progress, and one of the first tasks was to carry all that was movable to the rear of the beaches. German prisoners, now numerous, were used for this purpose. Among them were two who at first light were discovered concealed in a dug-out which had been occupied all night by some of our own troops.
The dead were collected into reserve areas and covered, awaiting burial.
A command post between Red and White beaches was established.
The beach limits were properly marked. Beach companies began to unload craft. The Royal Navy began to sink their gooseberry. In short, the operation really began to work, and by nightfall it was clear that the training had proved sufficiently practical to adapt itself to unforeseen circumstances. During the morning an attack was launched by a company of the South Lancashire Regiment (from the 8th Brigade) and the 41st Royal Marine Commando on the Lion strong-point, but the force employed was insufficient for the task. The South Lancashire Regiment had, however, succeeded in mopping up Plumetot and Cresserons, both of which hamlets were on the southern fringe of the beach maintenance area. D Company, two of the platoons of which had been kept afloat all night in the landing ships, tank, in which they had been embarked, relieved the commando later that day and covered the right flank of the beach area.
At 1100 hrs that morning eight Ju.88’s flew low in formation over the beaches from the direction of Franceville Plage, dropping canisters containing butterfly bombs. They were greeted by a storm of anti-aircraft fire from the Bofors and triple Oerlikon guns, now well established ashore. Several were hit, and one fell almost on top of the sub-area command post, scattering its bombs in all directions.
Apart from attacks by individual aircraft, one of which was to do much damage there were no more determined raids in daylight. Raids by night continued for weeks to come. Two attacks were normally delivered, one at midnight and another shortly before dawn. The landing of the heavy guns of the 103rd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment and the balloon barrage kept these aircraft high, and little serious damage was suffered from night raids in spite of dumps being hit. When the beaches were finally closed down forty-seven planes had been destroyed by anti-aircraft fire.
1842 – 52nd – Moved from St John to Frederickton, New Brunswick (Canada).
1876 – 52nd – The Depot Companies moved from Fort Wallington to Oxford to be incorporated with the 42nd Brigade Depot.
1916 - 1st Bn. (previously Provisional Bn.) Oxf & Bucks LI moved to Amara to refit.
1917 – 2nd Bn OXF & BUCKS LI – ROCLINCOURT.
82nd Reinforcement – 36 Rank and File joined.
Casualties – Wounded = 1
1917 – 1/1st Buckinghamshire Battalion – OUTPOST LINE.
Battn in the Line – Quiet Day. B Coy carried out an attack on enemy post situated K26a92 35. Zero 12mn. Attack carried out in accordance with 00 22 attached.
The attack started at 12.5 after a five minute barrage by 1 section of field guns according to programme. The enemy opened rifle fire before the assault took place but was silenced by Lewis Gun fire from trench in front of “CAGE”. This is confirmed by statement made by Unter Officer taken prisoner that the Machine Gun fire forced them behind the bank so that the next thing they knew was that the English were on top of them. There was concertina barbed wire in front of the canal but little difficulty was experienced in dragging it out of the way.
After the assaulting platoons got in there was a bombing fight for a few minutes, but the enemy soon gave in when our men went down the bank to them.
No attempt at a Counter Attack was made, but rifle grenades were fired from the opposite bank & from under the Canal bank further North at intervals for the rest of the night.
With the help of a RE Officer & 1 Platoon 5/R SUSSEX, the task of consolidation was quickly started & continued without interruption until 2.30am when it became very light. Besides the platoon of 5/R SUSSEX, 2 Platoons A Coy and the Support Platoon B Coy were sent up to help with the work.
A position was dug at K26a92 35 with a traversed trench about 30 yards long facing North and a Zig Zag trench 50 yards long under the canal bank facing East, the South end being connected up by a CT (Communication Trench) to the “CAGE” Trench.
The new post is garrisoned by 1 LG (Lewis Gun) Section & 1 Bombing Section & is sited on the wall & commands all ground up to the SLAG HEAP (K20 Central).
Prisoners Captured - 11 of the 41st IR
They state that the piquet has consisted of 2 groups of 1 NCO & 8 Men. 4 Were killed during our assault.
Our Casualties – 2 OR Killed 9 OR Wounded
Name of Officer I/C Attacking Force – 2LT E H FAWCITT
Ration Strength: 21 Officers 604 OR.
1944 - 2nd (Airborne) Bn, Oxf & Bucks LI -HEROUVILETTE
Engaged in capture of Herouvilette
0130 - Regiment passed Start Point 110739 moving forward to the Chateau in RANVILLE a temporary H.Q. was set up there.
The remainder of the Regiment moved into the area of the Chateau grounds and took up a position of all round defence.
Elements of the Bridge Assault Party joined us there including Capt B.C.E. Priday and the load from his glider, who having landed in the area of VARAVILLE Bridge, fought their way back to join the Regiment.
0230 - 13 Para Bn had been in contact with the enemy up to dark and reported that he was occupying HEROUVILLETTE.
On arrival at the Chateau it was arranged that the Regiment should take over the patrolling in front of 13 Para Bn and 'C' Coy was ordered to send out fighting patrols to discover whether the enemy were still in HEROUVILLETTE.
These patrols reported by 0430 hrs that there was no sign of the enemy in the village though they had not entered it.
'C' Coy was therefore ordered to move forward and seize the Western portion of HEROUVILLETTE and send patrols to discover whether the enemy were holding the Eastern portion.
'A' and 'B' Coys were then to move forward and seize the Eastern portion.
Meanwhile the remainder of the Regiment were to move forward to the area of the farm at 119728. This move was completed without opposition by 0830 hrs.
0830 - The Commanding Officer then decided to make a similar advance by bounds to seize and occupy ESCOVILLE the task allotted to the Regiment in the original plan before leaving ENGLAND.
'A' and 'B' Coys patrols moved forward to the village which they reported clear except for a few snipers.
1000 - At 1000 hrs 'A' and 'B' Coys were ordered to move up and occupy the positions already allotted to them and they were followed by 'D' Coy and Regimental H.Q.
'C' Coy was to remain at HEROUVILLETTE as a firm base until the remainder of the Regiment was established in ESCOVILLE.
At 1030 hrs the leading Coys reached ESCOVILLE and started to dig in.
1100 - Regimental H.Q. attempted to establish itself in CHATEAU 124714 as arranged but came under accurate fire from an enemy Self Propelled gun firing from a hull-down position about 250 yds South of the CHATEAU.
Attempts were made to dislodge this enemy gun with 6-pdr guns and PIAT parties but these proved unsuccessful. The Self Propelled gun appeared to be well protected by snipers. Meanwhile 'D' Coy moved round into its allotted position.
1200 - Coys were in position but experiencing difficulty owing to fire from armoured cars and other Self Propelled guns and snipers who appeared to be on a reverse slope position just South of the village and which were continually moving about.
We were visited about this time by the Brigade Commander.
Battalion HQ had still failed to get into the CHATEAU and HQ had been set up in a line of trees about 100 yds North of the CHATEAU itself. Shortly after this the enemy started accurate mortar fire in area of Regimental HQ and some casualties were suffered.
Owing to very accurate fire from enemy armoured vehicles 'A' and 'D' Coys had been unable to get well forward into good positions of observation and in particular the Anti/Tank guns were unable to get into their allotted positions or even into positions from which they could engaged the enemy Self Propelled guns.
1400 - Mortar fire and gun fire continued to be experienced by all Coys and an appreciable number of casualties were incurred. The enemy were very well concealed and although 3" Mortars were brought to bear on any Self Propelled guns that showed themselves fire was rather ineffective due to lack of observation.
1500 - The enemy began to become more bold and succeeded in shooting up the right forward Coy rather badly. At about this time fire from mortars and Self Propelled guns became intensified and enemy infantry began to infiltrate forward supported by tanks and one or two armoured cars. Owing to the fact that the Regt had never managed to get into an organised co-ordinated defensive position and there was considerable danger of becoming outflanked in a position not suitable for defence in view of the fact that ST. HONORINE had not been captured the Commanding Officerr asked for permission from Brigade to withdraw to a position on the highest ground in the village of HEROUVILLETTE. This permission was granted.
1600 - The Regiment withdrew to HEROUVILLETTE with 'C' Coy acting as rearguard protection. A portion of 'D' Coy the left forward Coy and 'A' Coy the right forward Coy who were heavily engaged at the time became cut off and had a spirited battle with enemy Armoured Fighting Vehicle's.
The Vickers Machine Gun's with 'A' Coy did some very good work before they withdrew.
'B' Coy reformed about 400 yds North of ESCOVILLE and were sent in as a counter attack to extricate the forward Coys. This was successfully accomplished with some casualties.
1700 - The Regiment took up a defensive position in the area of HEROUVILLETTE and commenced to dig in. Recce Patrols were sent forward to discover the enemy's further intentions. The remainder of the day and night was spent digging in. During the day the Regiment had suffered about 60 casualties. The Commanding Officer who had been injured on landing and was unable to get about on foot was evacuated by Medical Authority at about 2100 hrs and command of the Regiment was taken over by Major M. Darrell-Brown 2 i/comd.
1944-1st Buckinghamshire Battalion - NORMANDY
At his order group the the commanding officer stated that:
(a) Until the strong-point at Lion-sur-Mer could be captured the original plan was not practicable and the beach maintenance area could not be established.
(b) Development of the beaches, vehicle and transit areas would proceed as originally planned.
(c) Sector stores dumps established in rear of the beaches would be enlarged to hold all stores landed.
(d) Traffic circuits would be adjusted accordingly.
Work now started in earnest. Entrances and exits were completed, beach roadway put down, signs erected, and an ever-growing stream of men, stores and vehicles began to pour ashore. The beach was littered with debris of every description: wrecked landing craft, airborne bicycles, packs, explosives, waterproofing material, smashed tanks, and all the indescribable litter of war impeded progress, and one of the first tasks was to carry all that was movable to the rear of the beaches. German prisoners, now numerous, were used for this purpose. Among them were two who at first light were discovered concealed in a dug-out which had been occupied all night by some of our own troops.
The dead were collected into reserve areas and covered, awaiting burial.
A command post between Red and White beaches was established.
The beach limits were properly marked. Beach companies began to unload craft. The Royal Navy began to sink their gooseberry. In short, the operation really began to work, and by nightfall it was clear that the training had proved sufficiently practical to adapt itself to unforeseen circumstances. During the morning an attack was launched by a company of the South Lancashire Regiment (from the 8th Brigade) and the 41st Royal Marine Commando on the Lion strong-point, but the force employed was insufficient for the task. The South Lancashire Regiment had, however, succeeded in mopping up Plumetot and Cresserons, both of which hamlets were on the southern fringe of the beach maintenance area. D Company, two of the platoons of which had been kept afloat all night in the landing ships, tank, in which they had been embarked, relieved the commando later that day and covered the right flank of the beach area.
At 1100 hrs that morning eight Ju.88’s flew low in formation over the beaches from the direction of Franceville Plage, dropping canisters containing butterfly bombs. They were greeted by a storm of anti-aircraft fire from the Bofors and triple Oerlikon guns, now well established ashore. Several were hit, and one fell almost on top of the sub-area command post, scattering its bombs in all directions.
Apart from attacks by individual aircraft, one of which was to do much damage there were no more determined raids in daylight. Raids by night continued for weeks to come. Two attacks were normally delivered, one at midnight and another shortly before dawn. The landing of the heavy guns of the 103rd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment and the balloon barrage kept these aircraft high, and little serious damage was suffered from night raids in spite of dumps being hit. When the beaches were finally closed down forty-seven planes had been destroyed by anti-aircraft fire.
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