1793 - 52nd - present at the capture of Pondicherry (India).
1914 - Battle of Mons; 2nd Bn Oxf & Bucks LI present.
1918 - Battle of Albert; 2nd Bn Oxf & Bucks LI present.
1918 – 2nd Bn OXF & BUCKS LI - .
The Regiment had acted on the “Warning Order” (5th Inf Bde GS 740/162 of 22.8.16.) and completed its move to the area therein ordered (Fox Trench F.16 and nearest suitable ground) by about 2AM.
The final order (5th Inf Bde Order 319 of 22.8.18.) was not received till 4.40AM or thereabouts but no great inconvenience was caused and nearly everyone was able to get several hours early morning sleep before explanations had to begin, and it was not necessary to move the Regiment forward till 10AM.
At dawn the 3rd Division was successful in its attack on GOMIECOURT, so that it was possible for the 2nd Phase to begin, namely the 2nd Division to attack, the 5th Inf Bde on the Right, the 6th Inf Bde of the Left and the 99th Bde finding troops to protect the right flank of the advance, the objective being the village of Sapignies Behagnies and Ervillers on the Bapaume – Arras Road.
The 2nd Highland Light Infantry were to take Behagnies, the 24th Royal Fusiliers following, were to take Sapignies, and the Regiment was to follow and come into a Reserve Position.
The leading wave of the 2nd Highland Light Infantry was to cross the Achiet-le-Grand – Arras Railway at 11AM, the remainder of the Brigade following at the distances laid down. The advance was under a good artillery barrage, to which the regiment experienced little or no retaliation until approaching the line North and South through Courcelles-le-Comte, where shells began to fall among the small columns or “worms” in which the Regiment had been disposed, B and C Coys being on the Front Line, Right and Left, covered off by D & A Coys respectively. Regimental HeadQuarters in two columns following slightly in rear of of the 2nd Line until nearing Gomiecourt, where a temporary HeadQuarters was established with a view to finding out exactly the situation on the immediate right, further South as it did not at the moment appear to be progressing as it ought, before getting the regiment involved in what might be a flank fight southwards which might make it difficult to properly perform the roll of Reserve Battalion, when called on from the front subsequently.
A pair of Scouts however brought back some re-assuring information and the advance proceeded to an Aid Post Dugout at Triangle Copse, North East of Gomiecourt which became Regimental HeadQuarters that day and the next.
Here a Medical Officer and Aid Post and sundry others, about fifty prisoners in all and nine machine guns were taken by Regimental HeadQuarters.
About 1PM Lt Col R B Crosse DSO was wounded, a shell bursting in the entrance of the dugout.
Capt L E W O Fullbrook-Leggatt MC and Lt Smith US Medical Corps, the Medical Officer were also hit but only slightly and were able to remain at duty until the evening. Capt J Blagrove assumed command.
2.15PM – At 2.15PM the situation was that the 24th Royal Fusiliers and the 2nd Highland Light Infantry were held up in front of BEHAGNIES. The regiment was along H.1.c.9.1 and H.1.d.2.2 and moved up to banks about G.6.b.0.8 – G.6.b.0.4
At 2.5PM OC Left Support Company reported his company to be in touch with both Front companies and with 99th Brigade on Right. He was also in touch with 2HLI at G.6.b.
The situation remained unaltered until 6.0PM when OC C Coy stated that the 24th RF had withdrawn slightly in front of SAPIGNIES.
As this move placed three companies of the Regiment in front of the Support Company of the 24th RF these were withdrawn to the Sunken Road in A.29.d – A.30.c orders having been received to keep the Regiment in Reserve.
Touch being kept throughout the fourth company of the regiment was in position on the high ground about A.24.central. About the time of this withdrawal two enemy aeroplanes bombed the Sunken Road inflicting several casualties on A and D companies.
The remainder of the night passed without any change in the situation and about midnight 23/24 August Major G Field MC took over the command of the Regiment from Capt J Blagrove.
1918 –1/1stBuckinghamshire Battalion – KABERLABA.
Battalion relieved by 5th R WARWICKS.
B, D and 1/2 A Coy during Morning, C and remainder of A after dark.
Battalion went into camp at GRANEZZA SOUTH.
CAPT TROUTBECK to Hospital Sick.
Ration Strength: 24 Officers 582 OR.
Casualties: 1 OR Wounded 2 OR Wounded (slightly at duty)
1944 – 2nd (AB) Bn Oxf & Bucks LI – LE PT CASTEL - Normandy:-
1 R.U.R. had no success in their attempts to cross the river during the night, and the Regt was ordered to move fwd to TOURGEVILLE and 'D' Coy were sent fwd to occupy the high ground overlooking the river at ST. ARNOULT while the 1 R.U.R. moved further South.
'D' Coy suffered a few casualties from enemy arty and mortar fire during the day but our own arty returned the fire with interest and succeeded in silencing two of the hostile btys.
1944 – 1st Buckinghamshire Battalion (Normandy):-
AM - CO and Adjt visit 5 Kings at LION SUR MER who are in the same state of suspended animation as ourselves.
They still know nothing.
PM - CO and Adjt visit 101 Beach Sub-Area to see if they know anything.
Comd 101 Beach Sub-Area accompanies CO and Adjt to HQ L of C where 'A' branch assume that we have been under comd L of C since 1200 hrs 22 Aug.
They also state that we are to have a minimum cadre and after a lot of humming and hawing the infm is dragged from them that eventually we are to receive new intakes of 'bomb happy' gentlemen and recruits from England to train as a future garrison.
It was particularly stressed that this was still unofficial as 'officially' we must not be told anything.
This statement produced a certain amount of righteous indignation from the Comd Offr who asked how we were to know who to retain on the cadre if we did not know our future role. Everyone said they couldn't agree more but 21 Army Gp had apparently decreed that we were to be kept completely in the dark, so that was that. Highly unsatisfactory.
Visited Reforsec and were shown the cadre consisting of 16 Offrs and 136 ORs.
This stated that coy comds must go and the QM but we retained a skeleton Support Coy. Reforsec said that these men were urgently required and would be posted almost immediately, once we let them know our draft availability state.
The posn regarding stores and vehs was still not cleared up.